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Abstract:  
In this paper, we investigate the hybrid contingent claim approach with publicly traded 
Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Our goal is to assess 
how combining their continuous valuation by the market with the value given in their 
financial statements improves our ability to predict their probability of default. Our 
results indicate that the predicted structural probabilities of default (PDs from the 
structural model) contribute significantly to explaining default probabilities when PDs 
are included alongside the retained accounting variables. We also show that 
quarterly updates to the PDs add a large amount of  dynamic information to explain 
the probabilities of default over the course of  a year. This flexibility would not be 
possible with a reduced-form model. We also conducted a preliminary analysis of 
correlations between structural probabilities of default for the firms in our database. 
Our results indicate that there are substantial correlations in the studied data. 
 
 
Keywords: Default risk, public firm, structural model, reduced form model, hybrid 
model, probit model, Toronto Stock Exchange, correlations between default 
probabilities 
 
Résumé: 
Dans cette recherche, nous analysons l’approche contingente hybride à l’aide de 
données sur des entreprises privées transigées à la Bourse de Toronto. Notre 
objectif est de montrer comment la combinaison des valeurs continues de marché 
des entreprises avec celles des états financiers améliore les possibilités de prédiction 
des probabilités de défaut. Nos résultats indiquent que les probabilités de défaut 
structurelles prédites (PDs du modèle structurel) contribuent significativement à 
expliquer le risque de défaut lorsqu’elles sont incluses dans un modèle probit avec 
des données comptables. Nous montrons aussi que des mises à jour trimestrielles 
des PDs ajoutent beaucoup d’information dynamique pour expliquer le risque de 
défaut au cours d’une année. Cette flexibilité serait impossible avec l’utilisation 
exclusive du modèle à forme réduite. Nous avons aussi effectué une analyse 
préliminaire des corrélations entre les probabilités de défaut du modèle structurel. 
Nos résultats indiquent qu’il existe des corrélations importantes dans les données 
étudiées. 
 
Mots clés: Risque de défaut, entreprise publique, modèle structurel, modèle à forme 
réduite, modèle hybride, modèle probit, Bourse de Toronto, corrélations entre les 
probabilités de défaut. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper, we investigate the hybrid contingent claim approach with publicly traded 
Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Our goal is to assess how 
combining their continuous valuation by the market with the value given in their financial 
statements improves our ability to predict their probability of default. The reference 
model is a reduced-form specification that uses only accounting information from 
financial statements available at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
Two models are prominent in the financial literature: Merton’s structural model and 
Altman’s reduced-form model. The former has the benefit of being responsive, since the 
probabilities of default can continually be updated with the evolution of firms’ asset 
values. Its main flaw lies in the fact that it may over- or underestimate the probabilities of 
default, since asset values are unobservable and must be extrapolated from the share 
prices. The latter, on the other hand, is more precise, since it uses firms’ accounting 
data—but it is less flexible. Because the periodicity of the information is usually annual, 
the probabilities of default cannot be updated during the fiscal year. Technically, quarterly 
financial statements can be found, but their use is not widespread and they are not always 
audited by an external accounting firm. A final criticism of the second approach is that the 
predictions yielded by accounting data are not as reliable as those from market data. 
 
To address these issues, Moody’s has proposed a hybrid model. During a first phase, the 
probabilities of default are estimated using both methods, and subsequently, the 
probabilities of default from the structural model are integrated into the reduced-form 
model at each point in time as an additional explanatory variable. The appeal of the 
hybrid model is that it allows the probabilities of default to be continually updated by 
incorporating market information via the probabilities of default from the structural 
model. 
 
The Bank of England estimated the hybrid model with data from British firms and 
obtained some interesting results. In this report, we apply the hybrid model to Canadian 
firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. We also propose a preliminary analysis of 
the correlations between the estimated probabilities of default. This additional 
information is useful both for banks with portfolios including these firms and for eventual 
aggregate analyses by industry or by geographical region. 
 
This paper is divided as follows. Section 2 reviews the principal models in the literature. 
Section 3 describes the database used. Section 4 presents the estimation of the structural 
model and section 5 that of the hybrid model. Section 6 provides a preliminary 
assessment of the issue of correlation between the estimated probabilities of default, and 
the final section summarizes the main results and concludes the study by proposing some 
extensions. 
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2.  Review of the Principal Models for Evaluating Default Risk 
 
In this section, we will focus exclusively on scoring models. We will not examine models 
for rating securities, such as bonds or credit risk portfolio management models, although 
we shall analyze correlations in the last section. Readers interested in portfolio models 
can consult the excellent literature reviews in Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2000) and Gordy 
(2000), or delve further into the subject by studying the CreditMetrics model of Gupton, 
Finger, and Bhatia (1997). We shall also ignore the distribution of losses conditional on 
default. This distribution is often approximated by the product of the loss given default 
(LGD) and the risk exposure at the time of default (EAD). This risk exposure can be 
evaluated by the residual face value or the market value of the debt at the time of default 
(Dionne et al. 2005). 
 
2.1 Reduced-form (or non-structural) models 
 
The first scoring model for firms was developed by Altman (1968). Known as Z-score, it 
used five financial ratios to attribute a credit score to firms. These ratios, obtained from a 
discriminant analysis model, are weighted differently. The five ratios are: working 
capital/total assets, retained earnings/total assets, earnings before taxes and interest/total 
assets, market value of equity/book value of total liabilities, and sales/total assets. 
 
An extension to this approach has been the use of linear or non-linear regression models 
to directly estimate the probabilities of default. These models allow several ratios and 
assorted financial data to be considered simultaneously and provide descriptive statistics 
for the estimated parameters. Furthermore, they can explicitly model non-linearities 
between the financial variables and the score and, finally, directly compute the probability 
of default. Logit and probit models are often used. Typically, the greatest variations in the 
probabilities of default come from ratios capturing firms’ profitability, level of 
indebtedness, and liquidity. These models can be estimated on cross-section or panel data. 
 
Several banks use this method for privately owned and publicly traded firms, either by 
buying a model or its extension, such as Moody’s RiskCalc, or by programming their own 
estimation method. A problem they frequently encounter involves building an adequate 
database. Very often, credit files are not computerized or contain no historical data. 
 
The main benefit of reduced-form models is their precision in estimating probabilities of 
default. Furthermore, they are easy to use for financial institutions equipped with strong 
database management systems. Beaulieu (2003) demonstrates how data from a Canadian 
bank can yield very precise probabilities of default. On the other hand, these models are 
not flexible, since they require information from financial statements. Thus, it proves very 
difficult to update probabilities of default over the course of a year. Some institutions may 
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demand financial statements on a quarterly basis, but these are rarely audited. Another 
criticism is the absence in accounting data of anticipations regarding the future. They 
reflect the past well, but tell us nothing of the future. Market data are more relevant to 
forecasting probabilities of default. 
 
2.2 Structural models 
 
To respond to these criticisms, Merton (1973, 1974) proposed a structural model for 
calculating probabilities of default from market data. This model is a direct application of 
the Black-Scholes model (1973) for valuing European options. Stockholders own call 
options on the firm’s assets, the strike price of which is the debt level. At the horizon date, 
they exercise the option if the value of the assets exceeds that of the debt, then reimburse 
the debt and share the surplus. Otherwise, the firm is in default and stockholders do not 
exercise their option. Their loss is then equal to the initial investment. Thus, the 
probability of default is the probability that the option is not exercised. To evaluate this 
probability, we need to assign a value to the option. After having computed the mean 
value of the asset and its standard deviation by iteration, we can find the distance to 
default (DD), which is equal to the gap between the mean asset value and the value of the 
debt, normalized by the standard deviation of the asset value. The shorter this distance, 
the greater the probability of default (PD). 
 
To improve the basic Merton model, several extensions have been suggested in the 
literature. The one most relevant to our project is from Brockman and Turtle (2003). The 
main criticism levelled at Merton’s model is that it does not account for the possibility 
that the firm may default before the debt matures. Also, only stockholders are involved in 
exercising the option. In general, firms default before this horizon date and lenders (banks 
and other creditors) possess options (debt convenants) allowing them to pull the plug on 
firms if they observe that the latter are in breach of their debt obligations or are simply 
unable to pay. 
 
To formally account for these two dimensions, Brockman and Turtle (2003) propose 
using barrier options, which were introduced into the literature by Brennan and Schwartz 
(1978), Leland (1994), and Briys and de Varenne (1997). They use the down-and-out 
option, but other types can be applied. Thus, rather than stockholders who wait for the 
debt to mature before exercising a standard European call option, we have a down-and-
out option on the assets in which lenders hold a portfolio of risk-free debt and a short put 
option combined with a long down-and-out call option on the firm’s assets. The last part 
gives them the right (but not the obligation) to place the company into bankruptcy when 
they anticipate that its financial health can only deteriorate. 
 
This option makes it possible to place the firm into bankruptcy as soon as the value of its 
assets reaches the barrier, at any time before, or at, the debt’s maturity. The appeal of this 
option is that it can be adjusted to bankruptcy laws throughout the world, including in 
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Canada. One simply adjusts the parameters of the model. It can also account for the 
various restrictions imposed by creditors on the borrowing firms, such as maintaining a 
low debt-to-asset ratio, limiting dividend payments, curtailing merger activity, and not 
issuing further debt without permission. 
 
The authors demonstrate that Merton’s standard call option model is a special case of the 
barrier option model, and test their model on U.S. data. They empirically verify that the 
barriers are statistically different from zero, thus rejecting the standard European call 
option for all years, capital structures, and industries studied. Finally, they show that their 
model, with a barrier option, dominates Altman’s (1968) Z-score reduced-form model. It 
is important to emphasize that they may not have used the most advanced version of the 
reduced-form model. 
 
Other versions of the structural model have been suggested in the literature, including 
Moody’s KMV. We will not discuss them, since we do not use them. We refer the reader 
to the paper by Crosbie and Bohn (2003). 
 
Duan, Gauthier, and Simonato (2004) demonstrate that estimating the parameters of the 
Brockman and Turtle (2003) model by maximum likelihood yields results that resemble 
those from the iterative estimation method used in this literature when the theoretical 
model is Merton’s or when the capital structure is fixed. The appeal of the maximum-
likelihood method is that it allows for statistical inference or, more specifically, 
calculating descriptive statistics for the estimated parameters, such as the value of the 
firm. Another important aspect in the contribution by Duan, Gauthier, and Simonato 
(2004) is that the correspondence between the two estimation methods is not necessarily 
perfect when we insert an additional parameter into the structural model to account for the 
capital structure, as when Brockman and Turtle (2003) estimate three parameters (the 
value of the firm, its standard deviation, and a parameter for the capital structure owing to 
the barrier option) instead of two. In this particular instance, the maximum-likelihood 
method dominates, since it yields unbiased estimates of the parameters. Wong and Choi 
(2004) developed a maximum-likelihood model with endogeneity of the capital structure. 
In our study, we use the maximum-likelihood method with two parameters, as in the Bank 
of England study. However, we conduct various sensitivity analyses by shifting the 
barrier, which is equivalent to a sensitivity analysis of the capital structure. 
 
The structural approach has been criticized for overestimating the probabilities of default 
(Duan and Fulop 2005). The presence of trading noises on the exchange introduces 
randomness into the correlation between unobservable asset values and stock prices, thus 
annulling the one-to-one relationship between these two values. This relationship is very 
important, however, in applications of the maximum-likelihood method to unobservable 
data on assets, as in the structural model. The authors demonstrate that the presence of 
trading noises can affect the standard deviation in the Merton model. On the basis of their 
sample of securities, they find an average increase of 7.64 per cent in the standard 
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deviation, with a maximum of 25 per cent, which has an effect on the projected 
probabilities of default. 
 
Moody’s developed a hybrid model that combines the benefits of the structural and 
reduced-form approaches: Estimates of the probabilities of default are both flexible and 
precise. It is an extension to their reduced-form RiskCalc model. Moody’s version uses 
the structural model, adding the possibility that default may occur before maturity of the 
debt (Sobehart, Keenan, and Stein 2000). Sodehart, Keenan, and Stein (2000) do not use 
the structural approach to directly compute the probabilities of default. First, they find the 
value of the firm and its volatility, then they estimate the distance to default and use this 
measure in a logistic estimation of the probability of default. They show that integrating 
information from the structural model significantly improves the calculation of the 
probabilities of default in the reduced-form model. 
 
The hybrid model allows supplementary information to be integrated. For example, the 
structural model does not account for liquidity risk, though this risk is generally 
significant in multivariate structural analyses. The hybrid model also allows the 
profitability of firms to be incorporated more directly than the structural approach, at least 
in the case of firms whose stock is not very liquid in responding to good news, for 
example. Finally, the hybrid model allows macroeconomic factors to be included when 
the estimation period is sufficiently long. 
 
Tudela and Young (2003) present an application of the hybrid model. This application 
uses barrier options with a down-and-out call option. The researchers estimate various 
models on data from non-financial English firms for the period 1990–2001. One 
interesting particularity of their application is in the tests they propose. For their estimates 
of probabilities of default in the structural model, they use data on firms that did, and did 
not, default. Thus, they first verify whether the two firm types represent different 
predicted probabilities of default (type I and II errors). Second, they compare their hybrid 
model with other reduced-form models to see whether the added probability of default 
(PD) variable is significant for explaining probabilities of default. Third, they measure the 
performance of their model with power curve and accuracy ratio type instruments. 
The authors establish that, over a one-year interval, the mean probability of default for the 
non-defaulting firms is 5.44 per cent, while that percentage rises to 47.33 per cent for 
those that did default. The results of the error tests are satisfactory. They tested the model 
for probabilities of default over a two-year interval. They also performed dynamic 
analysis and found that the probabilities of default rise as the date of default nears.  
 
They further confirm that the PD variable is significant in their probit model, increasing 
the estimated likelihood significantly. Finally, the hybrid model outperforms other models 
when different tests (power curve and accuracy ratios) are used. 
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3.  Database 
 
In this section, we present the raw data and their sources, and explain how we constructed 
the database for the probability calculations. 
 
Our initial database contained 3,712 financial securities representing 1,339 firms that did 
not default and 130 firms that did, for a total of 1,469 publicly traded Canadian firms. A 
number of firms issue several different equities, which explains the higher number of 
securities. The study period for the probabilities of default is from January 1988 to 
December 2004. The methodology we use to compute the probabilities of default with the 
structural model requires that our data window extend 24 months prior to the estimation 
period for the predicted probabilities of default in order to ensure statistical reliability. 
Thus, stock exchange and accounting data were gathered for the period from 
January 1986 to December 2004. 
 
3.1 Defaults 
 
Firms that have defaulted are catalogued in Financial Post Predecessors & Defunct, 
Cancorp Financials (Corporate Retriever), and Stock Guide. Market data, to wit the 
market capitalization or market value (MV), are extracted daily from DATASTREAM’s 
DEAD.LLT series, while the frequency of the accounting data, from Stock Guide and 
CanCorp Financials, is annual. Between 1990 and 2004, 130 firms were identified as 
being in default: 112 were bankrupt and 18 were (or are) undergoing reorganization. 
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Table 1: Distribution of defaults and reorganizations 
Year Non-default Bankrupt Reorganization 
Total 
defaults 
1990 379 9 4 13 
1991 401 10 2 12 
1992 427 10 1 11 
1993 482 8 1 9 
1994 522 7 0 7 
1995 561 8 0 8 
1996 627 4 0 4 
1997 704 5 1 6 
1998 788 5 0 5 
1999 857 9 0 9 
2000 939 6 3 9 
2001 1,012 7 3 10 
2002 1,104 8 2 10 
2003 1,182 10 1 11 
2004 1,328 6 0 6 
Total 11,313 112 18 130 
 
 
To illustrate, column 2 of Table 1 shows the total number of observations on firms listed 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange (firm-year) that recur in our database, for dynamic 
analysis of probabilities of default. These are firms that did not default. The data are from 
DATASTREAM. We point out that DATASTREAM did not gather data on all firms in 
the early 1990s, which is why there are fewer observations. These data appear as reliable 
as those for later years, however, though they are less complete in their coverage of firms 
on the stock exchange. Figure 1 represents the evolution of defaults over time. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of defaults and reorganizations by year 
 
 
 
 
For the 130 firms that defaulted, we have 436 dynamic observations (firm-year) on 
accounting data, of which 378 are for firms that went bankrupt and 58 for those 
undergoing reorganization. 
 
After merging the accounting data with the daily market data, 108 firms remained in the 
intermediary database of defaults, i.e., for the first stage of our study during which we 
compute the probabilities of default using the structural model. This attrition is mostly 
attributable to missing market data for some firms, and the fact that we had only one year 
of accounting data for others—rendering the data unusable for our study. In fact, to be 
able to apply the structural model, we require at least one year for the estimation and 
another year for computing the probabilities for each firm. 
 
Two variables are vital for the first stage of calculating the probabilities of default with 
the structural model: market value and liabilities. We have 60,331 daily observations on 
market value and 69,822 observations on liabilities. This gap is attributable to missing 
market value data. 
 
Table 2 presents statistics on market value and liabilities for 108 firms having defaulted, 
after cleaning the data and merging the accounting and market data. 
 
Number of defaults
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the 108 defaults 
(in millions of Canadian dollars) 
Statistic Market value Liabilities 
Mean 335.04 185.25 
Median 14.57 15.33 
Mode 22.00 0.32 
Standard deviation 1,301.36 948.32 
Skewness 6.00 10.60 
Kurtosis 40.06 126.58 
Number of observations 60,331 69,822 
 
 
During the second phase of the study, i.e., during the probit regressions, only 57 of the 
defaulting firms remained in the final database. In several cases, the financial statements 
were insufficiently complete to create the variables required for a multivariate analysis, 
while others had not produced financial statements during the 18 months preceding the 
default. We believe that going back more than 18 months would not provide a 
representative picture of the firm’s real situation at the time of default. 
 
The data were processed, cleaned, and merged using SAS, version 9.1. 
 
3.2 Firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange that did not default 
 
The data on the firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange that did not default are from 
DATASTREAM’s FTORO.LLT series. The frequency of market value (MV) data is daily 
for the period from 1 January 1988 to 31 December 2004. Accounting data are from Stock 
Guide. Annual accounting data for the new fiscal year are only used four months after 
publication, since this is the average delay before investors have access to this 
information. 
 
In total, we have 3,109,201 daily observations for the market value variable. The mean, 
over all firms, is Can$854.93 million. The standard deviation is Can$4,758.10 million, 
owing to the existence of very high market capitalization values for some firms—the 
maximum being Can$366,399.75 million. 
 
In Table 3, we present the descriptive statistics for the daily market value variable for all 
firms listed in Toronto that did not default. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for all firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange  
that did not default (in millions of Canadian dollars) 
Statistic Market value 
Mean  854.93 
Median  59.03 
Mode  285.38 
Standard deviation  4,758.10 
Skewness  26.12 
Kurtosis  1,188.95 
Range  366,400.00 
Interquartile range  255.77 
Number of observations  3,109,201 
 
 
3.3 Various statistics on the firms retained for the study 
 
To begin our estimations, we merged the accounting database from STOCKGUIDE with 
the market database from DATASTREAM. However, we removed all financial 
companies from the two databases, considering that they did not belong in the study since 
the structure of their financial statements differs from those of non-financial firms. 
 
Our final database included 684 publicly traded non-financial Canadian firms, 627 of 
which did not default and 57 of which did. 
 
After merging and cleaning the data, we were left with 1,885,707 daily market value 
observations. The mean over all firms is Can$747.12 million, while the median is 
Can$48 million. This large difference is attributable to the very high value of market 
capitalization in the case of some firms. 
 
Compared to the entries in Tables 2 and 3, Table 4 provides some statistics for the 627 
publicly traded non-financial Canadian firms that did not default. 
 
We notice that, in terms of the mean, the median, and the standard deviation, there is little 
difference between the initial sample values in Table 3 and those in Table 4 for the final 
sample. 
 
 11
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the firms retained for the analysis 
(in millions of Canadian dollars) 
Statistic Market cap 
Mean  747.12 
Median  47.99 
Mode  2.09 
Standard deviation  4,247.97 
Skewness  38.79 
Kurtosis  2,380.02 
Range  366,400.00 
Interquartile range  269.35 
Number of observations  1,885,707 
Number of firms  684 
 
 
We also looked at the lags separating the default dates from the last financial statements 
of some firms. Many firms do not publish financial statements during their final years 
prior to bankruptcy. We felt obliged to withdraw from the database those for which these 
lags exceeded 18 months in duration. For the others, i.e., those that had defaulted between 
12 and 18 months after their final financial statement, we moved the date of the default up 
to reconcile it with the last observable accounting year. 
 
For example, in the case of a firm that defaulted in 2000 and whose fiscal year ended on 
31 December we need accounting data from 1999 to estimate the probabilities of default 
in 2000. To be able to estimate models using accounting variables, the time elapsed 
between the date of the publication of the final financial statement and the date of default 
should not exceed 12 months. Unfortunately, this time is longer for many of the defaults 
in our database. Knowing that many defaulting firms do not publish financial statements 
during the year leading up to official bankruptcy or reorganization, we dropped this 
condition and included those whose defaults occurred from the thirteenth through the 
eighteenth month after publication of their final financial statement. This, in turn, forced 
us to move up the default dates to make them correspond to the last year for which we had 
valid accounting data. This explains why we have defaults for the years 1988 and 1989, 
despite the fact that defaults began in 1990 in our initial sample. 
 
Table 5 provides an overview of the annual frequency of the data used in the final model 
for calculating the probabilities of default. We observe that eight defaults were moved up 
in 1988 and 1989. 
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Table 5: Annual frequency of the data used for the final model 
Year 0: Non-default 1: Default 
Total 
number Percentage 
1988 0 1 
99 
3 
97.06% 
2.94% 
1989 0 1 
111 
5 
95.69% 
4.31% 
1990 0 1 
132 
1 
99.25% 
0.75% 
1991 0 1 
149 
2 
98.68% 
1.33% 
1992 0 1 
150 
3 
98.04% 
1.96% 
1993 0 1 
177 
3 
98.33% 
1.67% 
1994 0 1 
185 
5 
97.37% 
2.63% 
1995 0 1 
229 
2 
99.13% 
0.87% 
1996 0 1 
280 
0 
100.00% 
0.00% 
1997 0 1 
328 
5 
98.50% 
1.50% 
1998 0 1 
381 
3 
99.22% 
0.78% 
1999 0 1 
427 
3 
99.30% 
0.70% 
2000 0 1 
462 
6 
98.72% 
1.28% 
2001 0 1 
505 
8 
98.44% 
1.56% 
2002 0 1 
563 
5 
99.12% 
0.88% 
2003 0 1 
588 
3 
99.49% 
0.51% 
2004 0 1 
66 
0 
100.00% 
0.00% 
Total 0 1 
4,766 
57 
99.49% 
0.51% 
 
 
 13
4.  Estimation of the probabilities of default with the structural model 
 
The literature on structural models distinguishes between at least two techniques for 
estimating the parameters. One is based on plain vanilla (standard) options, and the other 
is based on barrier options. In the second model type, the payoff is a function of a 
threshold price for the underlying asset. In our case, we use a down-and-out barrier call 
option; i.e., the option vanishes when the underlying asset reaches the barrier. 
 
We assume that the firm’s capital structure consists exclusively of debt plus equity. The 
level of the debt is denoted B , while ( )T t−  is the time to maturity. The firm’s value is 
tA  and the value, at time t, of debt maturing at time T is ( )V A,T, t . The value of equity 
at time t is v(A, t) . Consequently, the total value of the firm at time t is: 
( )tA V A,T, t v(A, t)= + . 
 
To compute the probability of default for this firm, we assume that the value of its assets 
follows the following Brownian motion process: 
 
 A AdA Adt Adz,= µ + σ  (1) 
 
where Aµ  is the mean of the value of the firm and Aσ  its standard deviation. 
 
Let dz dt= ε  with ( )~ N 0,1ε , i.e., the distribution of ε  is normal with mean zero and 
unit standard deviation. 
 
As to the liabilities, assume, on one hand, that the firm’s liabilities L  are the sum of 
short-term liabilities plus one-half of long-term liabilities. This assumption, which is used 
by Moody’s KMV for North American firms, ensures that the firm’s liabilities are not 
overstated. We perform sensitivity analyses on this assumption. On the other hand, we 
assume that L  follows a deterministic process: 
 
 LdL Ldt= µ . (2) 
 
Default occurs when the value of the firm’s assets falls below that of its liabilities. The 
“barrier” is the default point k
(
. Consequently, we only need to monitor the ratio: 
 
 Ak
L
=  (3) 
 
throughout the evolution of the firm’s debt and check whether it reaches k
(
, the default 
point. 
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From equations (1), (2), and (3), we can compute the path of k : 
 
k kdk ( )kdt kdz= µ + σ  
 
with k A L( )µ = µ −µ  and k Aσ = σ . 
 
Estimation of kµ  and kσ  is based on the probability density function of k  or, more 
specifically, the probability density function of T
t
k
k
   
. The probability that the barrier will 
not be reached and that the value will be T
t
k
k
   
 at time T , equals: 
 
( )
T
2
t k
k 1h ln
k 2 T t
   =   πσ −  
( )
( )
2
2
T k
k
t
2
k
kln T t
k 2
exp
2 T t
      σ  − µ − −           −  σ −      
 
( )
( )
2
22
T kk
kk
t tt
2 2
k k
k kk ln 2ln T t2ln
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This equation will be used to construct the likelihood function that we will maximize to 
estimate kµ  and kσ  for a given capital structure. The Bank of England set k
(
 equal to 1. 
We shall adopt this normalization. 
 
The conditional probability, given that the firm has not defaulted by time T , is: 
 
[ ] [ ]1 2PD 1 1 (u ) 1 (u ) = − −Φ −ϖ −Φ  , 
 
where 
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and Φ  is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution. 
 
Let 
t
kK ln k
 =   
((
. In the case of a European call option, the probability of default equals 
( )1uΦ . However, for a barrier option, we see that the term ( )21 uϖ −Φ    adjusts the 
probability of default to account for the fact that the firm may default before the horizon 
date T. 
 
For the estimation, we use MVy
L
= , i.e., the ratio of market value (MV) to debt L , as a 
proxy for the ratio Ak
L
= . We use Matlab to estimate kµ  and kσ  with the maximum-
likelihood method. Subsequently, we compute the probabilities of default. The parameters 
kµ  and kσ  are estimated daily, on the basis of a 261-day window for firms having 
defaulted and a 261×2, or 522-day window for those that did not. We needed to proceed 
thus in order not to lose too many observations for defaulting firms. A sensitivity analysis 
that consisted of imposing the same windows on both types of firms did not alter the 
results. The mean computed probability for firms that did not default is 8.08 per cent with 
the 522-day window and 8.8 per cent with the 261-day window. We pursued our work 
with the longer window to have more information and thus greater statistical reliability, 
since the default probabilities of several firms are very low. In our study, we set the 
default barrier at 1 ( y 1= ), i.e., the firm defaults when its market value (MV) equals its 
debt ( L ), which, in turn, initially equals short-term liabilities plus 50 per cent of long-
term liabilities. 
 
Table 6 reproduces the probabilities of default, computed one year prior to the period of 
risk exposure, for firms that did, and did not, default. The mean of the probabilities for 
defaulting firms is 35.46 per cent, while that for non-defaulting firms is 8.08 per cent. 
These annual means are 35.36 per cent and 7.51 per cent, respectively, when the 
percentage of long-term debt is 25 per cent, and 35.44 per cent and 8.63 per cent when it 
is 75 per cent. 
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Table 6: The probability of default for all firms,  
computed one year prior to risk exposure 
Year 
Probability of default  
for firms that did not 
default 
Probability of default  
for firms that did default 
1988 11.28% 40.05% 
1989 10.65% 46.62% 
1990 12.82% 44.93% 
1991 11.36% 53.53% 
1992 4.76% 36.09% 
1993 3.15% 31.56% 
1994 3.07% 29.78% 
1995 7.09% 48.96% 
1996 3.72% 33.91% 
1997 5.03% 24.24% 
1998 10.17% 30.27% 
1999 12.29% 34.29% 
2000 7.73% 20.56% 
2001 13.71% 35.69% 
2002 10.14% 41.07% 
2003 7.29% 15.94% 
2004 3.12% 39.12% 
Mean 8.08% 35.68% 
Number of firms 627 57 
 
 
The next two figures show the evolution of the probabilities of default over time for 
several firms. The ones in Figure 2 defaulted, while those in Figure 3 did not. 
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Figure 2: Daily default probabilities (1 year) of defaulting firms 
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The results in Figure 2 are consistent with the model, while those in Figure 3 are 
somewhat surprising. They represent two extreme cases and reflect our comments on the 
overstatement of the probabilities of default in the structural model, especially when there 
are shocks to the market. It is of interest to note, for example, that the value of Asbestos 
stock held between $15 and $20 during the period from early 2000 to mid-2001, then fell 
to below $5 from the middle of 2001 until the beginning of 2004, then rose again. The 
model appears very sensitive to significant fluctuations in the values of this firm’s stocks. 
 
The explanation is different in the case of Agricore. This firm resulted from a merger in 
2001. In 2002, the firm announced a change in its fiscal year, and consequently its 
financial statements covered a 15-month period. When computing the probabilities of 
default with the structural model, we use the ratio market value/liabilities from the annual 
reports. In the case of Agricore, liabilities covered 15 months in 2002, resulting in an 
increase in the default barrier (short-term liabilities plus 50 per cent of long-term 
liabilities) in the calculation of the probabilities of default for the following period. 
Consequently, the probabilities of default are very high in the years following 2002, as we 
see in Figure 3. The liabilities must be adjusted here to yield a more accurate picture of 
the firm’s true situation. This adjustment is far from straightforward, since it reflects not 
only a change of period but also a merger, and the required data are not available. This 
illustrates the structural model’s extreme sensitivity to variations in the inputs, providing 
the rationale for using the hybrid model, which contains more information for 
conditioning the estimates of the probabilities of default. 
 
As Figure 8 reveals very clearly, variations in the conditional probabilities of the hybrid 
model for Asbestos and Agricore Corporation are much more modest, though they remain 
sensitive to fluctuations in the inputs operating over variations in the probability of 
GRAFTON GROUP LIMITED
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default. Three smoother examples are featured in Figure 4. It is of interest to note that the 
probabilities of default of the three firms move in tandem with Moody's default cycles. 
 
Figure 3: Daily default probabilities (1 year) of non-defaulting firms 
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Figure 4: Other PDs (1 year) of non-defaulting firms 
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Evolution of observed default rates for all Canadian firms in the Moody’s database
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5.  Estimation of the hybrid model 
 
5.1 Methodology 
 
We did not estimate the model with a simple linear regression, since we know that it must 
reflect non-linear behaviour of the explanatory variables for defaults. In addition, it is 
well documented that simple linear models are inappropriate when the dependent variable 
is a probability. 
 
5.1.1 The probit model with cross-section data 
 
In the probit model, the dependent variable iy  is a dichotomous variable assuming the 
value 1 if an event occurs, and 0 otherwise. In our case, the variable iy  assumes the 
following values: 
 
iy = 1  if firm i defaults, and 
iy = 0  otherwise. 
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The vector of explanatory variables (financial ratios and other financial or business cycle 
variables) for firm i is denoted ix , and β  represents the vector of parameters to be 
estimated. The premise of the probit model is that there exists a qualitative response 
variable ( *iy ) that is defined by the following relationship: 
 
 * 'i i iy x= β + ε . (4) 
 
In practice, however, *iy  is an unobservable latent variable. The variable we actually 
observe is the dichotomous iy , such that: 
 
 iy  = 1  if  
*
iy 0> ; (5) 
 iy  = 0  otherwise. 
 
In this formulation, ' ixβ  is not ( )i iE y / x , as in the simple linear model, but rather ( )*i iE y / x . From equations (4) and (5), we have: 
 
 Prob ( iy  = 1)  = Prob (
'
i ixε > −β )  =  1 – ' iF( x )−β , (6) 
 
where F  is the cumulative distribution function of iε . 
 
The observed values of y  are simply realizations of a binomial process with probabilities 
that are given by (6) and vary from one observation to the next (with ix ). The likelihood 
function can thus be written: 
 
 ( )
i i
' '
i i
y 0 y 1
F( x ) 1 F( x )
= =
= ∏ −β ∏ − −βl , (7) 
 
and the parameter estimates β  are those that maximize l . 
 
The functional form of F  in equation (7) depends on the retained assumptions regarding 
the distribution of the residual errors ( iε ) in equation (4). The probit model is based on 
the assumption that these errors are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and 
follow a standard normal distribution N(0,1). The functional form can thus be written: 
 
 
'
ix 2
'
i 1/ 2
1 tF( x ) exp dt
(2 ) 2
−β
−∞
 −β = − π  ∫ . (8) 
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5.1.2 The probit model with panel data 
 
This model accounts for potential correlations between different observations on the same 
firm at different points in time (different financial statements). It is defined by the 
following regression: 
 
 * 'it it ity x= β + ε  (9) 
 
and the observed dichotomous variable is such that: 
 
 ity = 1  if  
*
ity 0> ; (10) 
 ity = 0  otherwise, 
 
where i represents the firm and t the time of firm i’s financial statement. To account for 
intertemporal correlation using a random-effects model, the error must be decomposed 
into two terms: 
 
it it ivε = + ϑ , 
 
where itv ~ N(0,1)  is the stochastic-error component and 
2
i u~ N(0, )ϑ σ  is the part of the 
error correlated with i, so that the two error components ( itv  and iϑ ) are normally 
distributed with mean 0 and are independent of each other. The variance of the error term 
itε  can now be represented by: 
 
2 2 2
it vvar( ) 1ϑ ϑε = σ + σ = + σ  
 
and the correlation is: 
 
2
it is 2corr( , ) 1
ϑ
ϑ
σε ε = ρ = + σ . 
 
Thus, the new free parameter is: 
 
2
1ϑ
ρσ = −ρ . 
 
This is the parameter that will make it possible to measure the existence of a correlation 
between the different observations (financial statements) of a single company over time. 
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5.2 Data and variable selection 
 
The principal objective of this study is to verify whether combining the reduced-form and 
the structural model into a hybrid model yields a better measure of the default risk than is 
obtained from traditional econometric reduced-form and structural models estimated 
separately. To accomplish this, we seek to explain defaults by estimating a probit model 
in which the explanatory variables are the estimated probabilities of default from the 
structural model, financial ratios, and other accounting and cyclical data. The dependent 
variable is a binary variable assuming the value of 1 if the firm defaults and 0 otherwise. 
Using this same methodology, we also estimate a model with only accounting data as 
explanatory variables (reduced-form model) and a third probit model in which the only 
exogenous variable is the probability of default (PD) from the structural model (the model 
that contains only structural information). 
 
Thus, we test the predictive power of the PD variable for explaining corporate bankruptcy 
by including it in the reduced-form model. If, after controlling for the effect of the firm’s 
accounting data, we find that the estimated coefficient of the PD variable is statistically 
different from zero, the probabilities of default yielded by the structural approach will be 
shown to contain information that is supplementary to that in the accounting data, and we 
will be able to use its coefficient to update the probability of default when the PD 
changes. 
 
As to the selection of accounting variables and financial ratios used in the reduced-form 
and hybrid models, we retained a wide array of variables and financial ratios liable to 
have an impact on the quality of the firm’s credit and for which we were able to obtain 
satisfactory data. This choice of variables was based on both empirical studies addressing 
the determinants of default in Canadian privately owned or publicly traded firms 
(Petrescu, 2005; Beaulieu, 2002; RiskCalc; Z-score) and on studies conducted in other 
countries (Bank of England). 
 
Since missing accounting items are quite frequent in the defaults database, we were faced 
with a dilemma: retain more accounting variables, and thus reduce the number of defaults 
in our database and, by extension, the statistical significance of our results; or eliminate 
variables at the cost of undermining the model specification. We found a compromise that 
seemed best to us. 
 
To make a sound selection, we started by estimating the probit model on each accounting 
variable separately. This allowed us to retain the most significant ones and thus reduce the 
number of missing observations in our final estimation. Starting from an original sample 
with 5,556 observations including 60 defaults, corresponding to observations for which 
were able to obtain the PD on an annual basis, we arrived at a sample of 
4,889 observations with 57 defaults. Descriptive statistics for the retained variables are 
presented in Table 7. The analysis covers the period 1988 to 2004. 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Mean annual PD (1 year) 0.09 0 0.21 0 1 
Cash 67.94 3.18 323.29 0 9,390 
Short-term assets 361.68 37.43 1,364 0 36,811 
Short-term liabilities 261.63 21.32 1,006 0 23,330 
Retained earnings 53.71 2.58 3,873 -156,950 15,426 
Net value 490.55 42.13 4,222 -1,726 163,016 
Total liabilities 792.94 41.81 2,875 0 53,466 
Total assets 1,361 92.39 4,688 0.02 93,931 
Profitability < 0(1) 0.25 0 0.43 0 1 
0 % < profitability < 6%(2) 0.12 0 0.32 0 1 
Net value/total liabilities 6.76 0.88 35.21 -0.95 1,214 
Retained earnings/total 
liabilities 
-3.3 0.09 26.74 -1,052 72.1 
Total liabilities/total assets 0.67 0.49 9.43 0 658.1 
Cash/total liabilities 0.73 0.08 3.01 0 68 
Cash/total assets 0.10 0.04 0.16 0 1.92 
EBITDA/short-term liabilities 0.11 0.41 4 -127.66 55.71 
GDP growth 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.06 
The accounting variables are in millions of Canadian dollars. 
(1) A dummy variable assuming the value 1 if the margin of profit (EBITDA/sales) is negative, 0 otherwise. 
(2) A dummy variable assuming the value 1 if the margin of profit (EBITDA/sales) is between 0 and 6%, 0 
otherwise. 
 
5.3 Analysis of the results 
5.3.1 Estimation of the probit model with different specifications 
 
In this section, we analyze the characteristics and performances of three models: the 
hybrid model, the reduced-form model, and the model containing only structural 
information. We summarize the results of these estimations in Table 8. 
 
In Model 1, we only use the information from the structural model, which is tantamount 
to treating the annual mean of the structural PD as an explanatory variable. Notice that the 
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probabilities of default used here are computed from data for the year prior to the 
estimation year. The coefficient of PD is 1.07 per cent, and it has the expected sign. It is a 
very significant predictor of the probabilities of default, with a p-value of less than 1 
per cent. However, the corrected pseudo-R2 is low (6.3 per cent). 
 
In Model 2, we estimate the reduced-form model on all of the retained accounting 
variables and financial ratios, adding the rate of growth of the Canadian GDP to account 
for the business cycle. Examination of the estimated coefficients reveals that these 
variables have the expected sign, aside from total liabilities, total assets, and their ratio. 
For example, the dummy variable for negative profitability has a positive coefficient, 
indicating that a negative profitability increases the probability of default compared to 
profitability exceeding 6 per cent. We also notice that 10 of the 14 accounting variables 
considered are significant at the 95 per cent confidence level, and that the effect of GDP 
growth on the probability of default is not statistically different from zero at any of the 
usual confidence levels. Moreover, examination of Model 2 reveals that the reduced-form 
specification largely outperforms the one using only information from the structural 
model (Model 1) in terms of its ability to explain corporate bankruptcy. The likelihood 
ratio is 246.98 for the reduced-form model, versus 36.93 for the structural model with 
only PD as an exogenous variable (the corresponding values of R2 are 20 per cent and 6.3 
per cent). At first glance, the PDs from the structural approach appear unable to generate 
adequate predictions of defaults of publicly traded Canadian firms, compared with 
accounting data. 
 
In Model 3, we estimate the hybrid model by adding the probabilities of default computed 
from the structural model to the explanatory variables from Model 2. An analysis of the 
results reveals that the PD variable is statistically significant at the 5 per cent confidence 
level. This suggests that the probabilities of default from the structural approach have an 
additional predictive power for corporate defaults than the firms’ financial statements. In 
addition, we observe that the estimated parameters from our reduced-form model are 
robust to the introduction of probabilities of default through the structural approach. We 
see neither major changes to the estimated coefficients of the accounting variables nor 
any loss of significance for some of these variables. Furthermore, to acquire a better 
understanding of the contribution of Model 3 relative to that of Model 2, we test the null 
hypothesis from Model 2 against the alternative hypothesis from Model 3. To accomplish 
this, we compute the likelihood ratio (LR) as follows: 
 
LR = –2 [log (L2)–log (L3)] = –2 (–186.9488+185.0268) = 3.844, 
 
where log(L2) and log(L3) indicate the log likelihood of Models 2 and 3, respectively. 
The distribution of the resulting statistic (LR) is chi-square with 1 degree of freedom. The 
critical value of this distribution at the 95 per cent confidence level is 3.8414. Thus, we 
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can reject the Model 2 specification in favour of that of Model 3 at the 95 per cent 
confidence level. 
 
We now repeat this analysis in Models 4 and 5, but this time only retaining the significant 
variables from Models 2 and 3. In Model 5, the PD variable is significant at the 
10 per cent confidence level, confirming the information contributed by the probabilities 
of default from the structural approach. Here again, the explanatory power of the model, 
as measured by the adjusted R2 and the likelihood ratio, increases only marginally with 
the introduction of the PD. The likelihood ratio rises from 240.81 to 243.65. The 
likelihood-ratio test allows us to reject Model 4 in favour of Model 5 at the 90 per cent 
confidence level. In fact, the value of the LR test is 2.83, compared to a critical value of 
2.79 for the chi-square distribution function at the 90 per cent confidence level. 
 
We proceed with a further test to assess the informational contribution of the PD variable, 
using a specification based solely on the significant accounting values. When we use SAS 
9.1 to perform a stepwise selection of variables to retain in the model, we observe that the 
PD variable is always kept along with the same four accounting variables from Models 6 
and 7. Thus, the accounting variables that are most relevant for predicting defaults in 
publicly traded Canadian firms are: profit margins, or, more specifically, the dummy 
variables for profit margins that are negative or less than 6 per cent, the ratio net 
value/total liabilities, and the ratio retained earnings/total liabilities. With this latter 
specification, the PD is significant at the 1 per cent confidence level. Finally, when we re-
ran the regressions using a panel probit model with random effects, the preliminary results 
remained essentially unchanged compared to those from the simple probit estimation. 
Details are available. 
 
Also, we re-estimated Model 5 with dummy variables for each year of the observations, 
with 1988 serving as the reference year. The only temporal variable that proved 
significant corresponded to the year 1999 (significant at the 90 per cent confidence level). 
However, when the macroeconomic variable for GDP growth was included, none of the 
year dummies remained significant. 
 
Table 8: Analysis of the maximum-likelihood estimators 
The estimated coefficients are on top, and the corresponding p-values below. 
Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant -2.4419 <0.0001 
-1.9541 
<0.0001 
-2.0344 
<0.0001 
-1.9663 
<0.0001 
-2.0411 
<0.0001 
-2.2734 
<0.0001 
-2.3473 
<0.0001 
Annual mean PD 
(1 year) 
1.0694 
<0.0001  
0.4568 
0.0446  
0.3791 
0.0863  
0.5432 
0.0080 
Cash  0.00752 0.0113 
0.00746 
0.0104 
0.00586 
0.0824 
0.00584 
0.0580   
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Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Short-term assets  -0.00919 0.0002 
-0.00912 
0.0002 
-0.00857 
0.0004 
-0.00836 
0.0003   
Short-term 
liabilities  
0.00346 
0.0030 
0.00345 
0.0029 
0.00308 
0.0069 
0.00299 
0.0073   
Retained earnings  -0.00400 0.0027 
-0.00379 
0.0036 
-0.00434 
0.0012 
-0.00416 
0.0014   
Net value  -0.00640 0.0013 
-0.00613 
0.0014 
-0.00668 
0.0009 
-0.00647 
0.0008   
Total liabilities  -0.00317 0.0083 
-0.00301 
0.0096 
-0.00333 
0.0074 
-0.00325 
0.0060   
Total assets  0.00372 0.0035 
0.00356 
0.0038 
0.00395 
0.0023 
0.00386 
0.0018   
Profitability < 0  0.9915 <0.0001 
0.9619 
<0.0001 
0.9603 
<0.0001 
0.9113 
<0.0001 
1.1999 
<0.0001 
1.1012 
<0.0001 
0 % < 
Profitability < 
6 % 
 0.4098 0.0460 
0.4088 
0.0500 
0.4079 
0.0411 
0.3996 
0.0476 
0.4510 
0.0097 
0.4261 
0.0166 
Net value/total 
liabilities  
-0.5401 
<0.0001 
-0.5353 
<0.0001 
-0.5462 
<0.0001 
-0.5249 
<0.0001 
-0.6444 
<0.0001 
-0.6174 
<0.0001 
Retained 
earnings/total 
liabilities 
 -0.0707 0.0026 
-0.0708 
0.0022 
-0.0680 
0.0037 
-0.0669 
0.0037 
-0.0909 
0.0003 
-0.0885 
0.0003 
Total 
liabilities/total 
assets 
 -0.0345 0.5903 
-0.0588 
0.3842     
Cash/total 
liabilities  
-0.2422 
0.8399 
-0.0497 
0.9660     
Cash/total assets  -1.6476 0.4245 
-2.0148 
0.3223     
EBITDA/short-
term liabilities  
-0.0146 
0.8130 
-0.00553 
0.9332     
GDP growth  2.9519 0.4346 
3.3481 
0.3773     
Number of 
observations 4,889 4,889 4,889 4,889 4,889 4,889 4,889 
Number of 
defaults 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
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Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
AUC 0.740 0.946 0.950 0.944 0.942 0.905 0.920 
Likelihood ratio 36.9380 <0.0001 
246.9282 
<0.0001 
250.7721 
<0.0001 
240.8134 
<0.0001 
243.6483 
<0.0001 
183.2470 
<0.0001 
189.9129 
<0.0001 
Log likelihood -292.0380 -186.9488 -185.0268 -190.0061 -188.5887 -218.7893 -215.4564
McFadden’s 
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.30 0.31 
* The likelihood ratio measures the explanatory power of the independent variables when the 
model is compared to a model with only a constant. 
 
5.3.2 Various tests 
 
In this section, we assess the capacity of the retained models to adequately rank defaulting 
and surviving firms. We do this using the accuracy ratios of the different models 
estimated, ROC curves, and gain charts. Sobehart, Keenan, and Stein (2000) provide a 
detailed description of methodologies for validating quantitative credit-risk models. 
 
In Table 9 and Figure 5, we reproduce the accuracy ratios of the seven models estimated 
so far. The accuracy ratio of the model containing only structural information is 48 
per cent. This ratio is maximized at 90 per cent for the hybrid model with all variables 
(Model 3). The same model, but without the probabilities of default from the structural 
approach, comes in at 89.2 per cent. This confirms the results from the preceding section. 
In fact, though the proportion of accurate rankings by the model with only structural 
information is 48 per cent of a perfect ranking, moving from the accounting model 
(Model 2) to the hybrid model (Model 3) only translates into a negligible improvement in 
the accuracy ratio. 
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Figure 5: Accuracy ratio 
 
To better understand the performance of the probit model, we point out that the accuracy 
ratios from similar studies, to wit those by Sobehart, Keenan, and Stein (2000) of 
Moody’s KMV and Tudela and Young (2003) of the Bank of England, are 76.7 per cent 
and 69 per cent, respectively, when only information from the structural model is 
included (versus 48 per cent in our study) and 77.09 per cent and 76 per cent for the 
hybrid model (versus 90 per cent for our model). Thus, it is clear that, despite the poor 
performance of our model with structural information, in comparison to those mentioned 
above, the hybrid model is able to correctly predict a greater proportion of the defaults in 
our sample. 
 
Table 9: Accuracy ratio 
Model Accuracy ratio 
Model 1: with only structural information 48.00% 
Model 2: accounting, with all variables 89.20% 
Model 3: hybrid, with all variables 90.00% 
Model 4: accounting, with significant variables 88.80% 
Model 5: hybrid, with significant variables 88.40% 
Model 6: accounting, 4 ratios 81.00% 
Model 7: hybrid, 4 ratios 84.00% 
 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
Model 1: 
Structural 
model 
Model 2: 
Accounting 
with all 
variables 
Model 3: 
Hybrid with 
all variables
Model 4:
Account. with 
significant 
variables
Model 5:
Hybrid with 
significant 
variables
Model 6:
Accounting, 
4 ratios
Model 7: 
Hybrid,  
4 ratios 
 31
For the ROC curve and gain-chart analysis of model performance, the model with 
structural information is Model 1. As to the rest, we retain the models with significant 
variables, to wit Model 4 for the reduced-form model and Model 5 for the hybrid model, 
so as to avoid errors in the predicted probabilities of default calculated from non-
significant coefficients. 
 
Table 10 presents an analysis of Type I and II errors for the three retained models. We use 
the predicted probabilities of default computed from the probit coefficient estimates. 
Then, we rank the observations according to these probability predictions. If their values 
exceed a certain threshold (in this case, the mean of the probabilities), the firm is 
considered to be in default. Conversely, if the predicted probability is below the threshold, 
the observation is considered not to be in default. Table 10 juxtaposes this ranking with 
the actual occurrence of defaults. For the chosen thresholds, a comparison of the 
performances of the three models reveals that the Type I and II errors for the hybrid and 
accounting models are identical and relatively small compared to those from the model 
with only structural information. Once again, we see the superiority of the accounting 
model compared to the structural model for predicting corporate bankruptcy. 
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Table 10: Performance in predicting defaults 
Model prediction Actual defaults Actual non-defaults 
Hybrid model (Model 5) 
Threshold: Mean of the predicted defaults = 11.46% 
Defaults 53 92.98% 
763 
15.79%** 
Non-defaults 4 7.02%* 
4,069 
84.21% 
Total 57 4,832 
Accounting model (Model 4) 
Threshold: Mean of the predicted defaults = 11.45% 
Defaults 53 92.98% 
763 
15.79%** 
Non-defaults 4 7.02%* 
4,069 
84.21% 
Total 57 4,832 
Information from the structural model only (Model 1) 
Threshold: Mean of the predicted defaults = 11.27% 
Defaults 30 52.63% 
728 
15.07%** 
Non-defaults 25 47.37%* 
4,104 
84.93% 
Total 57 4,832 
* Type I error in percentage; ** Type II error in percentage. 
 
 
The downside of the preceding analysis is that the choice of threshold is arbitrary, and the 
percentages of Type I and II errors depend upon this choice. The ROC curve provides a 
correction for this limitation. This curve compares the proportion of defaults that were 
correctly predicted (top, left-hand cell in Table 10) with the proportion of firms that were 
incorrectly predicted as having defaulted (the “false alarms,” top right-hand cell in Table 
10) for all thresholds of the ranking. In Figure 6, we reproduce the ROC curves for 
Models 1, 4, and 5. This graph clearly shows that the reduced-form accounting model 
dominates the model with only structural information. Despite performing adequately in 
terms of predicting the probabilities of default, the PD variable does not make a material 
contribution to the performance of the hybrid model. However, it should be noted that the 
structural information is not only used to improve the performance of calculations of the 
probabilities of default. It is also used for quarterly, or even weekly, updates to the 
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probabilities of default. We shall return to this point below. A brief description of the 
ROC function is presented in the appendix. 
 
Figure 6: Receiver operating characteristic function 
  
 
 
In the case of the gain chart, we proceed differently. We begin by ranking observations in 
decreasing order of their predicted probability of default. The ranking percentiles are on 
the abscissa and the percentage of defaults captured by the model is on the ordinate. A 
purely random ranking model would yield a 45° line from the origin, while a perfect 
model would capture every default within the first percentile. The gain chart for our 
hybrid model illustrates its capacity to detect a large percentage of corporate 
bankruptcies. In fact, for the hybrid model, Figure 7 reveals that 95 per cent of 
bankruptcies occur in the bottom 20 percentiles of predicted probabilities of default. The 
hybrid model does not owe this excellent performance to the structural model, but rather 
to the accounting model. 
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Figure 7: Gain chart 
 
 
5.4 Update of the predicted probabilities of default 
 
Despite the fact that the structural model proves unable to make a significant contribution 
to the accounting information in our model, in terms of its ability to adequately predict 
defaults of publicly owned non-financial companies in Canada, it does feature one 
undeniable advantage. Measures of probabilities of default can be obtained at a much 
higher frequency from the structural approach than from accounting data. It is also 
possible to update the probabilities of default predicted by the hybrid model by 
incorporating PD variables computed on a quarterly, monthly, or even daily basis—and 
we note that the PD variable is significant in all of the specifications we have examined. 
We conducted this exercise for some of the firms in our sample. We updated the 
probabilities of default predicted by the hybrid model by including a quarterly PD. Figure 
8 shows that the probability of default can increase dramatically in as much as a year. The 
same analysis can be applied at a greater level of aggregation, for example, to a given 
group of firms or sector. Finally, we provide an example with annual variations in the PD 
and financial statements. We observe substantial differences between the variations in the 
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PD of the structural model (Figure 3) and those in the probabilities from the hybrid 
model. These differences can be explained as follows. 
 
The only input used by the structural model is the ratio of the firm’s asset-market values 
to its liabilities. Estimates of the probabilities of default yielded by this model are very 
sensitive to the level and evolution of this ratio. However, results of the probit estimation 
of the hybrid model reveal that there are other factors that explain the occurrence of 
default in publicly owned Canadian firms. Moreover, it is known in the literature that 
structural models may overstate the probabilities of default, which is consistent with their 
very high values for Agricore and Asbestos in the structural model. Conversely, the 
probabilities predicted by the hybrid model incorporate variables other than the 
probabilities of default from the structural model, allowing a better estimation and 
calibration of those probabilities. Examination of Figure 8 reveals how the hybrid model 
allows errors in the estimates of the probabilities of default from the structural model to 
be corrected. Indeed, it appears clear that, despite the large increases in the structural 
probabilities of default, forecasts of the probabilities in the hybrid model vary more 
moderately. 
 
Figure 8: Quarterly and annual probabilities of default 
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5.5 Comparison of our results with those in Tudela and Young (2003) 
 
In the Tudela and Young (2003) paper, the structural model explains a greater proportion 
of defaults compared to our other research. In fact, the accuracy ratio of the structural 
model for British firms is 69 per cent, compared to 48 per cent for the Canadian firms in 
our sample. 
 
This difference is not necessarily exclusively attributable to differences in the samples. 
Our methodology differs from that of the Bank of England in several points of application 
of the hybrid model. These may explain the difference in the performance of the two 
categories of models despite the fact that we use the same structural model. 
 
1. To compute firms’ liabilities, Tudela and Young (2003) use cubic splines to smooth 
the series of liabilities into a continuous curve and thus avoid stepwise asset/liability 
ratios with abrupt jumps at the dates of publication of the financial statements, as we 
discussed in section 4. Use of the cubic splines method, or any interpolation method, 
is justified by the elimination of these undesired discontinuities that are detrimental to 
the estimation of the parameters and by the more accurate reflection of the firm’s true 
situation. However, from a practical perspective it must be borne in mind that 
implementation of such methods assumes that financial information is available for 
the following year, which is not at all true for the investor—as a result, the 
explanatory power of the structural model is overstated. Since we must assume the 
perspective of the investor, we do not apply this type of interpolation for calculating 
the inputs of the structural model, which may partly explain why the structural model 
performed less impressively in our model. 
 
2. Furthermore, following Vassalou and Xing (2003), we use only accounting 
information on firms’ liabilities that is also available to investors. In fact, accounting 
information is only published four months after the end of the fiscal year. Since we 
have the dates on which the fiscal years end for the firms in our sample, we lag the 
financial data four months to be sure that we are only using information available to 
investors at the time of estimation. Therefore, if the fiscal year ends on 
31 December 1999, we use only the 1999 accounting data as of 1 May 2000. This 
allows us to avoid overstating the structural model’s power of discrimination. 
Conversely, it should be noted that the database manager corrects the data of the 
preceding years when this proves necessary and, of course, possible. The firm must, 
however, provide a detailed justification for the alterations before they are made. 
 
3. Also, as to the use of the probability of default from the structural model as an 
explanatory variable in the probit, Tudela and Young (2003) use the mean of the 
probabilities of default from the structural model for the 12 months preceding the 
default. This assumes advance knowledge of the date of default, allowing this 
information to be integrated into the aggregate weekly probabilities of default. This 
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type of procedure creates a type of endogeneity that can bias the explanatory power of 
their model upwards. We, on the other hand, use the mean probability of default for 
the calendar year regardless of whether or not the firm defaults. 
 
4. Finally, Tudela and Young (2003) select the accounting variables to include in the 
hybrid model on the basis of preliminary research on British firms (Geroski and 
Gregg 1997). We select these variables from a large array of accounting variables and 
financial ratios based on their appropriateness for the sample studies and their 
potential for explaining firm defaults. In other words, we invested considerable effort 
into identifying the best possible specification for the reduced-form model before 
introducing the information from the structural model. This may also explain the 
better performance of the reduced-form model relative to the structural model in our 
study, in contrast to the results in Tudela and Young (2003). 
 
 
6.  Correlations between the probabilities of default 
 
In this section, we will propose a portfolio approach to credit risk. This means that we 
will seek to account for correlations between the risk of default for the firms within a 
portfolio in order to achieve better estimates of the global default risk for the entire 
portfolio. One rationale for developing such an approach to credit risk management lies in 
what we may call “concentration risk.” Concentration risk refers to an incremental 
portfolio risk resulting from increased exposure to a single debtor or a correlated group of 
debtors (for example, same bank, same industry, or same geographical zone). 
 
Another important reason for the portfolio approach to default risk is to more effectively 
and rationally account for diversification. Indeed, a bank’s decision to increase its 
exposure to a debtor will result in increasing the marginal risk. Conversely, an equivalent 
increase in exposure involving a debtor of the same quality, but that was not in the initial 
portfolio, will substantially lower the marginal risk. Thus, some positions, while 
individually risky, may only represent a small increase to the global risk of the portfolio, 
owing to the benefit of diversification. In the two following sections, we present a 
preliminary analysis of the correlations between the probabilities of default. 
 
6.1 Testing for the presence of correlation 
 
Before proposing a methodology to allow us to account for correlations between the 
defaults in a given portfolio of firms, we should test for the presence of this type of 
correlation among the probabilities of default of the firms in our sample. With respect to 
this, we propose a measure to detect the existence of such correlations between the 
probabilities of default. For this exercise, we will use the probabilities of default from the 
structural model, since these are available in time series that are better adapted to 
capturing the presence of correlations between them. It is reasonable to extrapolate that, if 
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such correlations are found in the probabilities yielded by the structural model, they 
should also be present in those computed from the hybrid model. 
 
We construct an index of monthly PDs, which is nothing other than the series of 
individual PDs for the 824 firms for which we have the data required by the structural 
model. We notice, for example, that this index may cover only a group of firms or a given 
sector. Thus, for each month in the period covered by our sample, we compute the mean 
PD for the firms as follows: 
 
tn
t it
i 1t
1I PD
n =
= ∑ , 
 
where tn  is the number of firms for which we have the probability of default for month t 
and itPD  is the probability of default of firm i during month t from the structural model. 
We obtain a monthly series for our index covering the 204 months (17 years) of our 
sample (1988–2004). 
 
Subsequently, we compute the correlation between each firm’s monthly PD and the index 
as follows: 
 
T
ii it t
t 1
1corr(PD ,I) (PD PD )(I I )
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= − −∑ , 
 
where 
 
T
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and T is the number of months for which we have valid observations on PD. 
 
This yields a correlation coefficient for each firm in our sample. Next, we simply 
calculate the mean of the correlation coefficients to obtain our measure of correlation, 
corr . 
 
N
i
i 1
1corr corr(PD ,I)
N =
= ∑ , 
 
where N is the number of firms for which we have valid monthly observations on the 
probabilities of default from the structural model. We thus obtain a correlation index of 
corr  = 19.68 per cent. 
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We check the validity of this measure by dividing the sample of firms into two equally 
sized subsamples and repeating the procedure. The mean correlation for each subsample 
is very near to the correlation coefficient for the entire sample. As a further test of 
robustness, we divided the observations into two subperiods of the same length, the first 
extending from January 1988 to June 1996, and the second from July 1996 to 
December 2004. We obtain a correlation coefficient of 17.71 per cent for the first 
subperiod and 19.38 per cent for the second. This demonstrates that the presence of 
correlation is not specific to the period or the sample, but is rather characteristic of the 
probabilities of default. Our results underscore the importance of accounting for 
correlations for adequately estimating joint probabilities of default for a set of firms. 
 
6.2 The portfolio approach to credit risk, an example 
 
CreditMetrics proposes an interesting approach to incorporating dependencies between 
default risks in a portfolio model of credit risk. We draw on it to derive an equivalent 
method that is better adapted to the data available to us. In the following, we select only 
two firms and use a concrete example for purposes of illustration, as we compute the 
credit risk for a portfolio of firms. 
 
The approach proposed here is based on Merton’s (1974) theoretical framework, in which 
the firm’s debts are treated as stockholders’ call options on the firm’s assets. In this 
context, the value of the firm is a stochastic variable with a certain distribution. If the 
value of the firm falls below the value of its debts, which we term the default threshold, it 
becomes impossible for the firm to honour its obligations and it is in default (Figure 9). It 
is a simple matter to extend this analysis to include changes on the credit side, as defined 
by rating agencies (e.g., Aa, B). This generalization requires assuming that, in addition to 
the default threshold, there are thresholds for the value of the firm below which its rating 
will deteriorate, as illustrated in Figure 10. The value of the firm’s assets relative to these 
thresholds thus determines its future ranking, allowing us to establish a link between the 
firm’s value and its credit rating. In the final analysis, if we know the distribution of the 
asset values, the default and credit rating transition thresholds, and the correlation 
between firms’ asset values, we can compute the joint probability of default for said firms 
(for example, the probability that two firms default simultaneously). 
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Figure 9: Structural model of the firm 
 
Source: CreditMetricsTM – Technical document. 
 
 
Figure 10: Structural model of the firm account for changes in credit ratings 
 
Source: CreditMetricsTM – Technical document. 
 
 
If we assume that we know the thresholds for the firm’s asset values, it remains for us to 
model the changes to these asset values in order to be able to describe the evolution of its 
credit. For this, we make the assumption that the distribution of the return to the assets 
(which we denote R) is normal with known mean and standard deviation. 
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It is now a simple matter to express the default thresholds in terms of the returns. Thus, 
we assume that for each class of risk, as defined by the rating agencies, there exists a floor 
below which the return to the firm’s assets will be insufficient to pay its debt. 
 
The default and risk migration thresholds are obtained from the transition matrices of the 
rating agencies. For example, according to Moody’s transition matrix (Table 11), the 
probability that a firm that was initially rated Baa will be rated Ba the following year is 
4.76 per cent, while the probability that it remains unaltered is 88.48 per cent. 
 
 
Table 11: Annual migration matrix 
Final rating Initial 
Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Default
Aaa 93.40 5.94 0.64 0 0.02 0 0 0 
Aa 1.61 90.55 7.46 0.26 0.09 0.01 0 0.02 
A 0.07 2.28 92.44 4.63 0.45 0.12 0.01 0 
Baa 0.05 0.26 5.51 88.48 4.76 0.71 0.08 0.15 
Ba 0.02 0.05 0.42 5.16 86.91 5.91 0.24 1.29 
B 0 0.04 0.13 0.54 6.35 84.22 1.91 6.81 
Caa 0 0 0 0.62 2.05 4.08 69.20 24.06 
 
 
In our case, we do not have the risk rating of the firms in our sample, so we use the 
probabilities predicted by our structural model to generate our own. We rank them 
according to their probabilities of default from the structural model and divide them into 
10 classes (10 deciles). Class 0 represents the firms with the poorest credit quality and the 
highest default risk. These firms correspond to the last decile of the structural PDs. Firms 
in class 9 are the least risky and have the lowest probabilities of default, corresponding to 
the first decile. We let the risk of default be measured by the probability that the firm will 
fall into the last category (class 0). Using this classification, we estimate the transition 
matrix from the history of risk class migrations for the firms in our sample. For example, 
we see in Table 12 that the estimated probability that a firm initially in class 3 will finish 
the year in the same class is 38.65 per cent. To obtain this estimate, we count the number 
of times a firm in class 3 remains in the same class the following year, then divide by the 
total number of observations starting in this class. 
 
Moreover, since we assume that the distribution of the return to assets is normal, we know 
that there exist threshold returns, iZ , where i = 0, 1, ..., 9, delimiting the transitions 
 43
between risk classes. For example, for a firm in class 3, if the return to assets R falls 
below Z0, the firm will be downgraded to class 0, and if Z0 < R < Z1, the firm will be 
downgraded to class 1. Furthermore, the assumption of normality allows us to compute 
the probabilities of these events: 
 
{ } { } 


σ
µ−Φ=≤= 00 ZZRPr0classPr  
 
{ } { } 


σ
µ−Φ−


σ
µ−Φ=≤≤= 0110 ZZZRZPr1classPr , 
 
etc. Here, µ and σ are the expectation and the standard deviation of the returns, and Φ is 
the distribution function of the normal distribution. The series of equations connecting the 
transition probabilities to the threshold values Zi allows us to compute these latter from 
the transition matrix we have already estimated. 
 
Working from the transition probabilities, we can estimate the values of iZ  where 
i = 0, 1, ..., 9 (see Table 9) for the two firms in our example, Adaptron Technologies and 
Agricore United. 
 
Table 12: Calculation of the threshold values associated with risk class migrations 
Class in 
2002 
Predicted 
class in 2003 Probability 
Thresh-
old Value 
  Adaptron Technologies 
3 0 1.64% Z0 -0.61 
3 1 5.93% Z1 -0.38 
3 2 23.72% Z2 -0.08 
3 3 38.65% Z3 0.24 
3 4 12.68% Z4 0.37 
3 5 6.54% Z5 0.46 
3 6 3.27% Z6 0.53 
3 7 2.45% Z7 0.59 
3 8 2.45% Z8 0.68 
3 9 2.66%   
  Agricore United 
4 0 1.43% Z0 -1.14 
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Class in 
2002 
Predicted 
class in 2003 Probability 
Thresh-
old Value 
4 1 2.25% Z1 -0.97 
4 2 5.93% Z2 -0.77 
4 3 20.04% Z3 -0.44 
4 4 35.58% Z4 -0.05 
4 5 17.18% Z5 0.18 
4 6 6.75% Z6 0.31 
4 7 5.11% Z7 0.46 
4 8 2.86% Z8 0.59 
4 9 2.86%   
 
 
Thus far, we have not examined the transition probabilities of the two firms individually 
by linking them to the returns to their assets. To compute the joint transition and default 
probabilities, we must establish whether the returns to assets are correlated. It remains to 
calculate the correlation coefficient ρ between the assets of the two firms. The estimated 
correlation coefficient between the assets of these firms is 0.04. We now find the 
variance-covariance matrix for the multivariate normal distribution. 
 
2
1 1 2
2
1 2 2
 σ ρσ σΣ =  ρσ σ σ 
. 
 
This allows us to calculate the joint probability of the two firms simultaneously being 
downgraded to 0. 
{ } '0 0Z Z' '0 0Pr R Z ,R Z f (r, r ', )drdr '−∞ −∞≤ ≤ = Σ∫ ∫ , 
 
where f (r, r ', )Σ  is the density function of the bivariate normal distribution with variance-
covariance matrix Σ . (With Matlab, the normal bivariate distribution function requires 
downloading the function mvncdf.) 
 
As an exercise, we use several values for the correlation coefficient in this paper. In the 
first instance, we assume that the returns of the two companies are independent, so that 
the joint probability of default is simply the product of the two marginal probabilities. In 
this case, it is 0.02 per cent. In the second instance, we assume perfect correlation 
between these returns (ρ = 1). In this case, the joint probability is 1.47 per cent, i.e., 
62 times higher than when the returns are independent. Finally, we look at the 
intermediary case of a correlation coefficient equal to 0.5. This yields a joint default 
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probability equal to 0.22 per cent, which is over ten times its value in the case of 
independence (Table 13). 
 
This underscores the importance of accounting for correlations between the probabilities 
of default in order to be able to properly assess firms’ default risks. 
 
Table 13: Calculation of the joint default probabilities given three hypotheses 
regarding the correlations between asset values 
Joint default probability
 Ranking 
Individual 
default proba-
bilities (class 0) 
Expected 
returns 
Variance of 
returns 
ρ = 0 ρ = 1 ρ = 0.5
Adaptron 
Technologies 3 1.63% 7.10% 0.0038 
Agricore 
United 4 1.43% -21.31% 0.0005 
0.02% 1.47% 0.22%
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The goal of this research was to determine how a continuous evaluation of the 
probabilities of default of publicly traded firms by the stock exchange might improve the 
prediction that a firm may default. One way of accomplishing this goal is to estimate a 
hybrid model in which the estimated probabilities of default from the structural model are 
introduced into the reduced-form model as explanatory variables. 
 
We conducted this exercise for publicly traded Canadian companies whose shares are 
traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Our results indicate that the predicted 
probabilities of default (PDs) contribute significantly to explaining default probabilities 
when they are included alongside the retained accounting variables. We also show that 
quarterly updates to the PDs add a large amount of dynamic information to explain the 
probabilities of default over the course of a year. This flexibility would not be possible 
with reduced-form models unless audited accounting data were available on a quarterly 
basis. 
 
We also conducted a preliminary analysis of correlations between structural probabilities 
of default for the firms in our database. Our results indicate that there are substantial 
correlations between these probabilities of default. If this information were to be borne 
out by a more detailed analysis of the data, that would suggest that holders of portfolios of 
corporate debt, such as banks, should account for these correlations when assessing their 
capital requirements. It would also indicate that these correlations should be accounted for 
when probabilities of default are aggregated across industries or regions for purposes of 
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economic policy. Finally, we provided a cursory presentation of a model allowing 
correlations between the values of firms’ assets to be used in calculations of joint default 
probabilities in the hybrid model. 
 
There are several possible extensions to this initial analysis. First, a method could be 
developed for aggregating the analysis over industrial sectors or over financial 
institutions’ portfolios. This aggregation should account for correlations between the 
probabilities of default of the firms included. Ultimately, this model could be used to 
construct more diversified loan portfolios by the banks. 
 
A second extension pertains to the estimation of the PD by the structural model. Two 
issues raised in the literature review have been ignored thus far. The first consists of 
estimating the parameter of the capital structure simultaneously with the other parameters 
by using the maximum-likelihood method in the structural model. The second involves 
applying the data-filtering algorithm of Duan and Fulop (2005) in order to reduce bias in 
the estimates of standard deviations associated with trading noises on stock exchanges 
that has an impact on the one-to-one relationship between asset values and firm values. 
 
Finally, it would be very useful to adapt this method to the purposes of economic policy. 
This requires finding the relevant aggregates and choosing the periods in which the 
aggregates must be continuously updated, so as to disseminate the information to the 
affected financial institutions. 
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Appendix: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves 
 
Given a sample of n observations, let n1 represent the number of defaults. We denote this 
group C1 and the remaining non-defaulting group of 12 nnn −=  observations C2. Risk 
factors are identified in the sample and a probit regression model is fit to the data. An 
estimated default probability, iπˆ , is calculated for the i-th observation.  
 
Now, assume that, for the n observations, we undertake to test a default prediction on the 
basis of the estimated probability of default. The highest values of the estimated 
probability are expected to correspond to default. A receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) curve can be constructed by shifting the threshold at which the estimated 
probability is considered a predictor of default. For each threshold z, the following 
measures can be calculated, where I designates the index function: 
 
number of defaults correctly predicted: 
1
i
i C
ˆPOS(z) I( z)
∈
= π ≥∑ ; 
number of non-defaults correctly predicted: i
i C2
ˆNEG(z) I( z)
∈
= π <∑ ; 
number of non-defaults incorrectly predicted as defaults: 
2
i
i C
ˆFALPOS(z) I( z)
∈
= π ≥∑ ; 
number of defaults incorrectly predicted as non-defaults: 
1
i
i C
ˆFALNEG(z) I( z)
∈
= π <∑ . 
We obtain the values for: 
1n
)z(POSySensitivit =  and 
2n
)z(FALPOSyspecificit1 =− . 
